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An ‘equal effort’ approach to assessing the North-South climate finance gap 
1. Introduction 
The notion that countries should bear global climate costs in proportion to their 
income level and historical responsibility has been a key subject of discussion since 
the beginning of climate negotiations. In 1992 high-income regions agreed to cover 
the ‘full incremental costs’ faced by developing countries, although no clear 
definition of the concept exists (UNFCCC 1992). In 2009 the Copenhagen Accord set 
a goal for high-income countries to mobilise jointly US$ 100 billion a year by 2020 ‘to 
address the needs of developing countries’ (UNFCCC 2009). However, the success of 
this initiative is still uncertain. 
Two major issues preventing a coordinated commitment to climate finance are, first, 
the absence of a well-defined rule for how to calculate the amount of economic 
support that would have to flow from high-income to developing countries and, 
second, what exactly these flows should be used for. A common procedure in the 
academic literature is to estimate the ‘incremental investment’ that developing 
countries would have to undertake (for example, in the energy supply sector) 
because of climate-change mitigation and adaptation (Gupta et al. 2014). However, 
there is no compelling reason why North-South climate finance flows should be 
equal to incremental investment. In many instances, efficiency-focused climate 
policies might lead to a decline of total energy supply investment – i.e. negative 
incremental investment – because of reduced energy demand. Additionally, the 
overall climate-related macroeconomic costs suffered by emerging economies are in 
any case likely to be much higher than the incremental investment needed, 
comprising not only extra consumption foregone to make way for investment but 
also changes in welfare brought about by changes in relative prices, including in 
some countries adverse changes in the terms of trade (Bowen et al. 2014).  
In this paper we thus employ an original approach that involves the thought 
experiment of equalising overall climate mitigation costs – measured as a share of 
regional GDP – through a global carbon market. This is done using the results of the 
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Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) participating to the LIMITS project1 (Kriegler 
et al. 2014; Tavoni et al. 2015). We consider the resulting financial flows to be the 
lower bound of the international transfers required to make the allocation of 
mitigation costs ‘equitable’.  
The projected flows of finance from permit trading are then compared with 
estimates of current North-South climate financial flows from a variety of sources. 
We find the former to be larger than both current and planned international climate 
finance flows, and discuss the most effective strategies to fill this gap. Expanding 
private finance, either in the form of Foreign Direct Investment or through the 
issuance of ‘green bonds’, appears to be a particularly promising direction. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the LIMITS models and 
scenarios. Section 3 presents the international climate-related financial flows 
resulting from the implementation of an ‘equal effort’ allocation rule. Section 4 
discusses the likelihood of a global carbon market capable of delivering such flows. 
Section 5 briefly describes the state of other channels of North-South climate 
finance. Section 6 draws some policy implications for filling the climate-change 
mitigation finance gap and argues in favour of private finance. Section 7 concludes.  
2. The modelling framework 
This study involves six Integrated Assessment Models2 from the LIMITS project; 
GCAM (Kim et al. 2006), IMAGE (Bouwman et al. 2006), MESSAGE  (Riahi et al. 2011), 
REMIND (Leimbach et al. 2010) , TIAM-ECN (Keppo and van der Zwaan 2012) and 
WITCH (Bosetti et al. 2009). The models use a harmonised group of ten geographical 
regions (Africa, China+, Europe, India+, Latin America, Middle East, North America, 
                                                             
1
 ‘LIMITS’ stands for ‘Low climate IMpact scenarios and the Implications of required Tight emission 
control Strategies.’ 
2
 Integrated Assessment Models are large-scale numerical models that simulate the dynamic 
interconnections among the economy, climate and the energy system; details of the ones 
participating to LIMITS can be found in Kriegler et al. (2014). 
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Pacific OECD, Reforming Economies and Rest of Asia) 3. All models cover the time 
period from 2020 until 2100. 
IAMs are subject to a number of critiques. For instance, their high level of 
aggregation and long-term perspective prevent them from distinguishing among 
different economic agents and sectors or studying the effect of macroeconomic 
fluctuations. They also abstract from a number of market imperfections, most 
notably in fossil-fuel markets, when determining the optimal path for an economy. A 
systemic critique of the use of IAMs has been recently developed by Stern (2013) 
and Pindyck (2015) among others. Despite their shortcomings, IAMs are nonetheless 
powerful analytical tools widely used by the scientific community and often 
employed to inform policy-making. Furthermore, the diverse range of modelling 
techniques and assumptions represented by the LIMITS models makes the 
comparison exercise reflect features of the uncertainty around future physical and 
economic trajectories.  
All the models are used to run the same set of scenarios. The three scenarios most 
relevant for the purposes of this paper are presented in Table 1: a reference scenario 
with ‘weak’ climate policies (RefPol); a stringent climate policy scenario (RefPol-450); 
and a stringent climate policy scenario with emissions permits and permit trading 
(RefPol-450-EE). None of the model scenarios explicitly take into account any 
benefits of avoided climate change or any costs of adaptation; hence the LIMITS 
projections do not reflect a cost-benefit analysis, but rather focus on a cost-
effectiveness assessment of policies to keep below the 2°C ceiling. 
The RefPol scenario assumes that for the rest of the century individual regions 
implement only the commitments included in the Copenhagen agreement. These 
                                                             
3
 For the purposes of this paper, high-income economies include North America, Europe and Pacific 
OECD (plus Rest of the World for WITCH and REMIND). Emerging Economies include Africa, China+, 
India+, Latin America, Middle East, Reforming Economies and Rest of Asia. For more details, see 
Tavoni et al. (2014). 
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commitments are low and fragmented across the regions and lead by 2100 to an 
increase in global temperatures of 3-4°C (Kriegler et al. 2014)4.  
The RefPol-450 scenario, by contrast, is LIMITS main mitigation scenario. It assumes 
that the Copenhagen Commitments are applied until 2020 but then a globally 
uniform carbon price is introduced so as to achieve a concentration target of 450 
parts per million of CO2 equivalent (CO2e) by 2100.
5 This can be thought as a carbon 
tax applied in all regions, and on all GHGs covered by the Kyoto Protocol. This 
scenario delivers efficient climate-change mitigation, in the sense that suitably 
discounted consumption is maximised or the discounted costs of decarbonising the 
energy system are minimised (depending on the model). 
In the RefPol-450-EE scenario, where EE stands for ‘Equal Effort’, each region is 
allocated a certain amount of emissions allowances, which can then be used or sold 
to other regions in a global carbon market. The allocation of allowances is designed 
to equalise mitigation effort across regions, in the sense that, from 2025/2030 
onwards, all regions incur the same mitigation costs as proportion of GDP. A more 
detailed description of the scenario can be found in Tavoni et al. (2014). 
Despite implementing a mechanism that aligns current and future proportional 
mitigation costs across all regions, the burden-sharing rule proposed by the ‘Equal 
Effort’ scenario does not necessarily achieve an ‘equitable’ allocation or warrant 
universal acceptance of its fairness, as it contains no elements of progressivity and is 
likely to disappoint those countries arguing to include historical responsibility as a 
criterion for burden-sharing in climate negotiations6.  Additionally, it is debatable 
whether the equalisation should include costs related to changing patterns of 
international energy trade - i.e. whether the export revenue losses due to the 
                                                             
4
 Beyond 2020, regions are assumed to maintain a rate of emission intensity improvement broadly 
consistent with the one achieved through their pre-2020 action. See the Supplementary Material of 
Kriegler et al. (2014). 
5
 A concentration of 450ppm CO2e is consistent with a probability of greater than 67% of remaining 
below the 2°C ceiling. Temporary overshooting of targets is allowed. 
6
 More generally, an extensive literature exists on climate burden-sharing mechanisms and equity in 
the distribution of abatement costs (Höhne et al. 2014; Rose et al. 1998) and a number of rules have 
been suggested to find a cost allocation agreement that could be perceived as fair by both high-
income and developing regions, based on convergence of per capita emissions, carbon intensity, 
historical responsibility, grandfathering, or a combination thereof.  
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implementation of climate policies in fossil fuel exporting countries should be 
compensated (Clarke et al. 2014).  
However, we believe the ‘Equal Effort’ scenario capable of providing an extremely 
useful benchmark case, to be interpreted as the minimum standard that would have 
to be satisfied in order to consider the allocation mechanism ‘fair’. The international 
financial flows resulting from RefPol-450-EE are therefore the lower bound of what 
would be necessary: anything below them is highly unlikely to be acceptable to 
developing regions. 
 [Table 1 ABOUT HERE; LIMITS scenarios summary] 
3. Results: North-South climate finance 
3.1. The unequal distribution of costs under efficient mitigation 
The models project that emissions in RefPol-450 peak in 2020 and start declining 
rapidly immediately thereafter, reaching negative values by the end of the century. 
This causes a loss in income with respect to the baseline RefPol scenario, but growth 
rates remain positive in all regions. 
Although total mitigation costs in this scenario are minimised, they are strongly 
unequally distributed across regions. Figure 1 reports the regional costs7 associated 
with climate-change policies in RefPol-450 as a proportion of global average 
mitigation costs8.  The Figure shows how high-income regions (Europe, Pacific OECD 
and North America) bear a small proportion of overall mitigation costs, while low-
income regions (Africa, India and others) and energy-exporting countries (Reforming 
Economies and Middle East) suffer mitigation costs well above the global average. 
These results – roughly consistent across models – are due to a variety of reasons, 
including different abatement potentials, the amount of baseline emissions, energy 
                                                             
7
 As in Tavoni et al. (2014), we compute regional mitigation costs using: consumption losses for 
models with a macro-economic component (MESSAGE, REMIND and WITCH); abatement costs for 
IMAGE and GCAM; and energy system costs for TIAM-ECN.   
8
 Comparing regional mitigation costs with global mitigation costs helps to control for the differences 
in projected global mitigation costs (cumulated over 2020-2050) across models, which are 
pronounced; projections range from 0.51% of global GDP (IMAGE and GCAM) to 5.84% (WITCH). 
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intensities and the importance of energy exports (Gupta et al. 2014; Tavoni et al. 
2014). 
[Figure 1 ABOUT HERE; Regional mitigation costs per unit of GDP relative to World in 
RefPol-450 (2020-50 cum. values, NPV 5%)] 
This unbalanced distribution of costs presents a serious obstacle to international 
climate negotiations. Given the historical responsibility of high-income countries for 
bringing about climate change so far (MATCH 2008), it is hard to imagine low-income 
developing regions agreeing to an arrangement in which climate-change mitigation 
costs (relative to GDP) are placed mainly on their shoulders. 
In order to examine the conflict between efficiency and equity along mitigation 
paths, the RefPol-450-EE scenario is assessed in the next section. 
3.2. Financial transfers under the ‘Equal Effort’ scenario 
Despite the allocation of emissions allowances according to the ‘equal effort’ rule, in 
the LIMITS models projected emissions still take place where it is most cost-effective 
to emit. The regions for which allowances are larger than their projected emissions 
sell the excess permits to those regions for which projected emissions are higher 
than the allowances initially allocated. The size of the resulting carbon market range 
from 1 to 6 GtCO2e per year, depending on the model. This corresponds to an 
economic value of US$ 400-2,000 billion around 2050. 
Figure 2 shows the direction of the carbon market financial flows, cumulated over 
the 2020-2050 period and as a percentage of regional GDP. The total economic value 
of the carbon market never exceeds 1% of GDP for a region, except in WITCH and 
REMIND projections, in which it reaches 3-4% in certain regions. High-income 
regions (Europe, Pacific OECD and North America) are projected to be net buyers of 
emissions allowances across all models. In some models, the outflow represents only 
a small fraction of a percentage point of regional GDP, in others (mainly WITCH and 
REMIND) the cost of buying additional emissions allowances reaches 1-2% of GDP. 
The remaining regions show a higher degree of variability across models, but they 
broadly appear to be net sellers of allowances. These are particularly large in the 
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case of Reforming Economies and the Middle East. This is due to the high mitigation 
costs that these regions, as energy exporters, suffer in the mitigation scenario 
without carbon trade: the equalisation of efforts required by the RefPol-450-EE 
scenario creates large financial inflows for them. The African continent also seems to 
benefit from the ‘equal effort’ allocation, although to a lesser extent.  
[Figure 2 ABOUT HERE; Climate-related financial transfers in RefPol-450-EE (2020-
2050 cum. values, NPV 5%)] 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of financial transfers from high-income to emerging 
economies over the 2020-2100 period. Despite a few exceptions, the general trend 
of these flows seems to be upwards throughout the century. By 2050, four out of six 
models report a North-South financial transfer of around US$ 400 billion, while in 
REMIND and WITCH this is higher (US$ 1 trillion and US$ 2 trillion respectively). By 
2100, North-South climate finance flows have surpassed the US$ 1 trillion mark in 
four of the models, and WITCH reports again a higher value (around US$ 6 trillion). 
However, these aggregate amounts hide a large variability across regions. China, for 
instance, is projected to have strong financial outflows during the second half of the 
century according to REMIND; the same happens with Africa and India for WITCH, 
Latin America for MESSAGE and Rest of Asia for GCAM and REMIND. 
 [Figure 3 ABOUT HERE; Total annual financial flows to emerging economies in 
RefPol-450-EE] 
The resulting financial flows are pure ‘compensatory’ budget transfers. They result 
from the equalisation of mitigation effort but they are not necessarily earmarked to 
finance climate-friendly activities in developing countries. In other words, there is 
nothing in the models that requires international carbon market flows and energy 
investment expenditure to be linked. However, it is possible to draw a comparison 
between the two variables to have a sense of their relative size. The curves in Figure 
4 represent the average across models9, and give an indication of how adequate 
potential carbon finance inflows are in terms of supporting the required energy 
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transition. A value beyond 100% means that the financial flows resulting from 
carbon trade will be higher than the optimal energy supply investment, which could 
therefore be indirectly financed by those regions that need to purchase allowances. 
The results show that inflows for both Middle East and Reforming Economies will be 
more than enough to finance the overall amount of their energy investment10. The 
proportion of investment financed by external resources in China will hover around 
20-30% until 2070, and will then increase above 100% by the end of the century. 
Africa will manage to cover a relevant proportion of its energy investment during the 
next few decades, with a peak around 55% in 2030, but will then become a net 
purchaser of allowances in the second half of the century. A similar trajectory is 
followed by Latin America, India and Rest of Asia.  
[Figure 4 ABOUT HERE; Carbon financial flows as % of optimal energy supply 
investment] 
4. The outlook for global carbon markets 
The previous section has presented projections of the financial transfers that would 
be necessary to equalise mitigation efforts across regions while keeping below the 
2°C ceiling. How realistic is it to expect a global market in emissions allowances, such 
as the one assumed in the RefPol-450-EE scenario, to deliver such flows? 
Unfortunately, the outlook is not encouraging at the moment. 
The only current market-based instrument capable of generating climate-related 
finance flows from high-income to developing economies is the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The CDM was set up by the Kyoto Protocol to provide countries 
with quantitative mitigation obligations (Annex I countries) the option to acquire 
emissions reductions from mitigation projects implemented in non-Annex I 
countries. Given that developing regions often offer cheaper mitigation options, the 
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 This result confirms the relevance of trade-of-terms effects. However, the issue of whether 
exporters of fossil fuels should be compensated for the loss incurred because of changes in trade 
patterns is not likely to affect our results on North-South flows. A calculation looking at the difference 
between climate finance inflows and fossil fuel exports suggests that, while their regional distribution 
would be affected, the overall flows to developing regions would only marginally change.  
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CDM allows high-income countries to meet their emission reduction targets at a 
lower cost, while promoting sustainable development in emerging economies.  
From 2005 to 2014 around 7,500 projects were registered to the CDM, leading to a 
reduction of 1.5 billion tonnes of CO2e and an investment of US$ 410 billion in 
climate-friendly activities (UNEP DTU 2015). Flows of funds to emerging economies 
of around US$ 2.2-2.3 billion were generated from sales of Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) in 2009-10 (Clapp et al. 2012). Unfortunately, due to the European 
economic crisis and problems with the design of the EU Emissions Trading System, 
the price of CERs has fallen sharply. As a result, the incentives for potential project 
developers to invest have been reduced. From 2012 to 2013, investment in CDM-
supported activities dropped from its peak of almost US$ 200 billion to just above 
US$ 20 billion (UNEP DTU 2015).   
Although the CDM market has substantially weakened, it has helped prepare the 
ground for other carbon markets to arise. At the international level, the UNFCCC is 
coordinating the effort to create a ‘New Market-based Mechanism’, which, together 
with a ‘Framework for Various Approaches’, should help ‘to enhance the cost-
effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions, bearing in mind different 
circumstances of developed and developing countries’ (UNFCCC 2012, 2014b). 
Additionally, governments around the world have incorporated lessons learnt from 
the CDM in the design of new emissions trading schemes. There are currently 19 
regional, national or and subnational ETS operating. Around 7% of global emissions 
are now covered by these carbon markets (World Bank and Ecofys 2014).  
These markets could be the precursors of a global carbon market yet to come, to be 
achieved by gradually linking up the sub-global ones (Flachsland et al. 2009; Ranson 
and Stavins 2014). A link between the California and the Quebec cap-and-trade 
programmes was set up successfully in January 2014. However, other plans to link 
carbon markets are currently frozen. Furthermore, discussions regarding linking have 
until now concerned only high-income countries (USA, Canada, European Union, 
Australia, Switzerland) so that, even if implemented, they would not contribute to 
making finance flow towards emerging economies.  
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5. The current state of North-South climate finance 
If a global carbon market is unlikely to be implemented in the near future, how 
feasible is the achievement of this ‘efficient and equitable’ level of North-South 
climate finance? The rest of the section will address this question by discussing a 
number of sources and channels of finance that might be used to fill the gap 
between the current state of climate finance and the LIMITS results11. 
Estimating climate-related financial flows – and in particular the ones flowing from 
high-income to developing economies – is not an easy task. Data  tend to be of low 
quality, fragmented and unverified (Clapp et al. 2012; CPI 2014; Stadelmann and 
Michaelowa 2013). Despite these caveats, some estimates have been provided in 
the recent literature on climate finance. CPI (2014) calculates the financial resources 
flowing from OECD to non-OECD countries in 2013 in the range of US$ 30-55 billion, 
depending on the method used. Most of this finance originates in development 
institutions, either bilateral or multilateral. Private investment and bilateral aid also 
play a role, while climate funds contribute only a very small proportion. UNFCCC 
(2014a) estimates North-South climate finance is in the range of $40-175 billion per 
year in 2011-2012, with the private sector accounting for a relevant portion of total 
flows. 
Public climate finance can be of two main kinds12. First, high-income countries can 
decide to transfer financial resources directly to an emerging country to help its low-
carbon development. In recent years, the climate component of bilateral Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) has become increasingly relevant, reaching US$ 21.9 
billion in 2013 (74% of which had mitigation objectives), equal to 17% of total ODA 
flows (OECD DAC 2014). Second, high-income countries can support multilateral 
                                                             
11
 A precise comparison between sources of climate finance and LIMITS results is not possible. While 
the carbon market in LIMITS model can be thought of as providing budget support to regions with 
projected financial inflows, with no explicit requirement to use them for low-carbon investment, the 
sources and channels we discuss in this section are unequivocally directed to investment. 
Additionally, the highly aggregate nature of LIMITS models prevents us from distinguishing between 
different types of flows (public and private, for instance). Finally, in the LIMITS models, financial flows 
take place only from 2025/2030 onwards, while current commitments and projections of climate 
finance seldom go beyond 2020. 
12
 For a more detailed discussion of source and channels of public climate finance, see Gupta et al. 
(2014) and Bowen (2011). 
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institutions, which in turn supply finance for climate-friendly activities in developing 
countries. There are, for example, a growing number of ‘climate funds’, initiatives 
designed to help developing countries address the challenges of climate change. In 
2013, climate funds spent around US$ 2.2 billion (CPI 2014), a very low proportion of 
overall North-South climate finance, and an even smaller proportion of the flows 
needed in the future. The establishment of the Green Climate Fund (GCF) in 2010 
was the centrepiece of the UNFCCC strategy of raising US$ 100 billion per year for 
climate-friendly investment in developing countries (UNFCCC 2009).  
Private finance is potentially the most important source of funds for climate 
mitigation investment. Nelson and Pierpont (2013) estimate that as much as US$ 45 
trillion are currently managed by OECD institutional investors holding long-term 
assets. Private investment flows can be divided between Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) – which lead to a controlling stake of the activity (>10%) – and portfolio 
investment (<10%). Stadelmann and Michaelowa (2013) estimate North-South 
climate FDI to have been in the range of US$ 10-40 billion per year, and portfolio 
investment around US$ 4-5 billion, in the period 2008-2011.  
A third type of North-South climate finance source is represented by Development 
Financial Institutions (DFIs), including national development banks (e.g. Germany’s 
KfW), multilateral development banks (MDBs) (e.g. the World Bank) and bilateral 
financial institutions, (BFIs) (e.g. the Japan International Cooperation Agency - JICA). 
All these types of development financial institutions have a prominent role in 
providing climate finance. In 2012, DFIs committed US$ 121 billion while during 
2007-12 at least US$ 425 billion were provided to projects for renewable energy 
production, energy efficiency and other environment-related activities (BNEF 2013). 
However, most of the US$ 121 billion were invested domestically, with only US$ 15-
22 billion taking the form of international North-South flows.  MDBs and BFIs have 
nonetheless become increasingly important in managing the international financial 
flows between OECD and non-OECD countries, delivering the majority of total North-
South climate finance, according to CPI (2014).  
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6. How to fill the climate-change mitigation finance gap 
Comparing the estimates provided in the previous section with our model-based 
projections of required North-South climate finance, there is likely to be a large 
mitigation finance gap from 2020 unless actual flows are ramped up rapidly. 
However, a number of obstacles prevent this gap being filled. 
6.1. The only way is private? 
The shortcomings of public climate finance appear particularly hard to overcome. 
Despite the recent increase of climate-related ODA, the economic crisis reduced the 
already low aid commitments of high-income countries. In 2013, the long-standing 
objective of OECD countries to deliver the equivalent of 0.7% of their Gross National 
Product (GNP) as ODA had been achieved by only five countries out of 2813, and it is 
not clear whether high-income countries will agree to increase their contributions to 
climate finance, and, if they do, without diverting resources from other development 
objectives. 
The multilateral climate finance goals to which high-income countries have 
committed are also rather unambitious. By the end of 2014, commitments of capital 
to the Green Climate Fund reached only just over US$ 10 billion - only a very small 
proportion of what models show will be needed - and disbursements were not 
expected to start until late 2015 (Fenton et al. 2014; Schalatek et al. 2014). Even so, 
pledges can later be easily neglected14. Moreover, the recent emphasis in many 
high-income economies on reducing budget deficits does not favour helping 
countries that will soon be direct competitors and that will be able to finance 
climate-change mitigation on their own if necessary (Bowen et al. 2014). 
It is therefore probably safe to say that it is not from the fluctuating goodwill of 
policy-makers that we should expect the financial resources required to fill the 
North-South climate finance gap. Private, profit-driven investment motivated purely 
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 Data source: OECD DAC; available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/.  
14
 According to Climate Funds Update, out of a total of US$ 34 billion pledged for climate funds by 
February 2015, only US$ 15.7 billion (46.2%) have been deposited so far, and only US$ 1 billion (3%) 
disbursed. See climatefundsupdate.org/data. 
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by financial returns may underpin international climate finance more effectively than 
the reluctant commitments of debt-burdened governments. This can originate from 
both high-income economies’ firms investing directly in developing countries or 
development banks, among others, redirecting the resources raised on private 
capital markets through the issuance of ‘green’ financial instruments. These two 
channels of finance already represent the source of the overwhelming majority of 
global climate investment (CPI 2014).  
6.2. The outlook for climate investment 
At the moment, climate-friendly investment opportunities are not sufficiently 
attractive from an economic perspective at either the domestic and international 
level. This is due to typical features of many low-carbon assets such as long-term 
time horizons, high initial capital costs, high financing costs and, more importantly, 
strong perceived risks related to technology evolution, market development and 
policy support (Frisari et al. 2013). Additionally, many developing countries may 
encounter difficulties in attracting low-carbon FDI because of legal and institutional 
obstacles (e.g. insufficient incentives and regulation, legal protection and lack of 
transparency) and socioeconomic challenges (e.g. lack of skills, expertise or training) 
(UNCTAD 2013). Some of the key factors in attracting FDI, such as market size, 
potential and availability of natural resources, cannot easily be influenced by public 
policy interventions (Hornberger et al. 2011). 
Various public policies can be designed and implemented to modify the risk/return 
profile of abatement activities, the most important of which is the introduction of a 
price on carbon: changing the system of price incentives should make green 
activities more attractive to firms and households. To complement carbon pricing, or 
to substitute for it when it would be politically infeasible or economically 
detrimental to introduce it, there is a wide variety of other policy instruments that 
can be employed, including de-risking government instruments, ‘green’ industrial 
policies and financial regulation (Campiglio 2015; Fay et al. 2013; Hourcade et al. 
2012; WEF 2013). Additionally, it is essential for governments of low-income 
countries to develop robust investment promotion strategies by improving their 
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institutional and regulatory framework, as BRICS countries have been doing in recent 
years (Bayraktar 2013; UNCTAD 2013).  
Therefore, despite being driven by ‘ethically neutral’ market considerations, climate-
friendly foreign direct investment still requires a number of facilitating public policies 
in order to take place, which are subject to the same issues as public finance – weak 
commitments and poor long-term planning. 
6.3. Green bonds: a possible game changer 
Even more promising, and not as dependent on public policy as FDIs, is the private 
finance flowing to developing regions through the issuance of ‘green bonds’ by 
companies, projects or development banks (BNEF 2014; CBI 2015; Clapp et al. 2015). 
Typically, the funds raised by the issuance of green bonds are ring-fenced for specific 
environmental objectives but benefit in the same way as traditional bonds from the 
financial standing of the issuer and offer similar risks and returns to financial 
investors. This is especially true for green bonds issued by multilateral development 
banks, which have been among the most active promoters of their diffusion. Despite 
the possible higher underlying risk, debt instruments issued by the likes of World 
Bank and European Investment Bank can benefit from high ratings and market-
average yields, which make them attractive to institutional investors. 
Green bonds thus have a substantial potential for driving financial resources towards 
low-carbon sectors, especially if issued in large amounts and in a standardised 
fashion. The market is already in a phase of rapid expansion, and the outstanding 
amount of green bonds in 2015 – both ‘labelled’ and ‘unlabelled’15- is around US$ 
598 billion, which represents a 16% increase from previous year (CBI 2015). 
7. Conclusions 
This study has employed a number of Integrated Assessment Models to determine 
what financial transfers between high-income and developing economies would 
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 ‘Unlabelled’ green bonds are bonds whose proceeds are employed for climate-related activities but 
are not formally categorised as ‘green’. The outstanding amount of ‘labelled’ green bonds in 2015 was 
around US$ 66 billion. 
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have to be if climate mitigation effort, measured as mitigation costs as a share of 
GDP, were to be equalised across regions. This can be interpreted as the minimum 
standard of North-South financial flows to be satisfied to have a commonly agreed 
‘equitable’ allocation of costs. Four out of six models imply that a North-South 
annual financial transfer of around US$ 400 billion is required by 2050, while the 
other two models imply larger sums. By 2100, the ‘efficient and equitable’ climate 
finance flows to developing countries will be well above US$ 1 billion according to 
four of the models.  
We found the warranted transfers to be larger than both current and planned 
international climate finance flows.  Additional resources will have to be employed 
to meet the models’ projections of finance needs. However, a global carbon market 
as envisioned in LIMITS models seems unlikely to be created in the short to medium 
term. The only market that allows for significant international flows, the Clean 
Development Mechanism, is now moribund. The development of new carbon 
markets - most notably the prospect of a unified Chinese trading scheme - certainly 
represents good news, but will not help with generating international finance flows 
to help achieve mitigation commitments.  
Among the other forms of North-South climate finance, we found private sources 
and channels more promising than public ones, despite the fact private investment is 
often crucially dependent on the implementation of public policies. Public finance 
will still be necessary for sectors in which financial returns are likely to be low even 
in presence of such policies (e.g. adaptation activities). The expansion of the market 
for  ‘green bonds’ – debt financial instruments placed by companies, projects and 
development banks on private capital markets – is likely to be particularly helpful. 
Finally, some consideration must be given to the appropriate governance 
arrangements for future North-South finance flows. In the event that climate finance 
does expand as rapidly as the projections in this paper suggest is desirable, several 
developing countries will have to manage financial inflows that are significant 
relative to GDP.  Countries with immature financial intermediation systems and 
unstable public institutions may incur in a ‘climate curse’ triggering macroeconomic 
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difficulties through exchange rate appreciation, rent-seeking and the undermining of 
fiscal discipline (Jakob et al. 2015). Developing countries should therefore continue 
to improve the efficiency of domestic financial intermediation and ensure 
monitoring, transparency and debate about the use of the finance flows.  
A sounder legal and financial system will also help to raise domestic finance in 
developing countries. Historical experience suggests that emerging-market 
economies will be able to finance the low-carbon transformation of their energy 
supply systems reasonably easily from domestic saving flows if necessary, 
particularly if they use revenues raised from carbon pricing to finance investment in 
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